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Abstract
Because the use of trade policy is limited by international institutional arrangements,
governments pursuing a policy of export promotion may want to use more indirect
instruments to achieve their objectives. In that context, this paper focuses on the public
provision of export insurance. While the prime objective is insurance against the risk of
default faced by firms exporting to risky markets, these insurance programmes are often
embedded in more global policy objectives of the exporting country’s government. This
paper investigates how premium rating of official export insurance is affected by strategic
export promotion and the pursuit of other political objectives. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates how public insurance schemes can be used to serve
trade-related 1 or other objectives. A political economy perspective on interna-
tional trade policy suggests reasons why policy makers may want to use such
schemes for goals other than the provision of coverage to risk averse individuals.
Firstly, the objective function of policy makers may incorporate a trade-off
) Fax: q353-1-708-3934.
Ž .E-mail address: Gerda.Dewit@may.ie G. Dewit .
1 The reverse question, to what extent trade policy can be used as a substitute for insurance, has also
Ž . Ž .been studied. See Hillman 1989, Chap. 9 and Dixit 1990 .
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between the traditional welfare losses of intervention and the interests of specific
Žgroups in the economy see, for instance, Hillman, 1989; Long and Vousden,
.1991 . Secondly, although direct trade intervention is restricted by international
regulations, governments can be imaginative in finding ways to use trade policy
Ž .without incurring sanctions Rodrik, 1995 or to take advantage of the discretion
Ž .that some rules allow Schuknecht, 1991; Finger, 1993 . It has also been suggested
that the choice of trade policy instruments is governed by the principle of optimal
Ž .obfuscation, because of political advantage Magee et al., 1989 ; that is, indirect
methods of intervention may be preferred by governments, to make policy
inconspicuous and less noticeable by losers from the policies.
Subsidisation embedded in official export insurance schemes is a less transpar-
ent way of promoting exports than direct subsidisation. In this paper, I consider
export insurance in the context of trade with use of trade credits. In many
OECD-countries, the political risk of default associated with export credits is
Ž .usually at least partially covered by an agency that is owned or supported by the
government. Although explicitly prohibited by the WTO, official export insurers
tend to operate with sustained budgetary losses. This implies that, overall,
Žofficially insured export credits are subsidised Abraham et al., 1992; Kuhn et al.,
.1995; Dewit, 1996; Boote and Ross, 1998 . In other words, premium rates often
systematically fail to reflect accurately the risk in the export contract that is
covered. Due to the involvement of the government, premia may be affected by
goals other than insurance. This paper examines how strategic motives aimed at
profit shifting in oligopolistic markets on the one hand, and politically motivated
aid on the other hand, can skew the premium rating in official export insurance
schemes.
I first ask to what extent official export credit insurance programmes can be
consistent with strategic export promotion, when the only concern of the govern-
ment is with domestic welfare maximisation. A rationale for strategic export
Ž .promotion was first set out in Spencer and Brander 1983 and Brander and
Ž . 2Spencer 1985 . However, strategic trade policy rules are very sensitive to
industry-specific features, implying that governments may not have the informa-
tion necessary to implement the optimal policy. The proposal has been subjected
Ž . Ž .to various other critiques for instance, see Dixit, 1984 . In particular, Lee 1990
notes that, when foreign ownership of firms is taken into account, the strategic
Ž .export subsidy is smaller than in the standard Cournot case. Feeney and Hillman
Ž .2001 go further and argue that diversification in firm shares through international
asset markets leaves no welfare basis at all for government intervention through
strategic trade policy.
Secondly, I examine how export insurance policies might be influenced by the
possibility that the government of the exporting country has a political interest in
2 Ž .For a survey of the subsequent literature, see Brander 1995 .
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the importing economy. Because of such interest, a government may wish to
incorporate the provision of AaidB into its export insurance schemes.
While politically motivated aid always mandates a subsidy, optimal strategic
intervention can imply a tax or a subsidy. When the scheme involves a subsidy,
Ž .there will be two surreptitious beneficiaries. More specifically, in that case
export insurance subsidisation entails benefits to both domestic firms and foreign
consumers. Moreover, both these parties benefit irrespective of whether the motive
for subsidisation is to capture foreign rents, or to secure political support of
domestic firms or even to provide political assistance to the importing country.
However, the distribution of the benefits between domestic firms and foreign
buyers depends on which of those motives is dominant in the government’s
objective function underlying the provision of export insurance.
In the model, exporters allow foreign importers deferral of payment. This
implies a risk of default. The focus is on the political risk of default, which is the
risk of default by the importing country as a whole. Export insurance for this type
of risk typically is almost exclusively provided by a government insurance agency,
referred to in the model as Athe governmentB. In a two-stage game, the govern-
ment first sets the export insurance premium rate and firms then choose their
Ž .export action i.e., quantity or price . Section 2 gives a brief overview of the
stylised facts and figures for the provision of official export credit insurance. The
Žpremium rate set by a government that cares about domestic profits net of subsidy
.costs only is derived in Section 3. The home exporter is here assumed to be a
monopolist in the export market. This allows the determination of optimal
premium rating in a benchmark case without strategic interaction between home
and foreign firms. Section 4 derives the premium rate when the home firm
competes with a foreign rival in the export market. In Section 5, optimal premium
rating is discussed when export insurance, in addition to being used for strategic
purposes, also incorporates an element of aid. The final section sets out some
concluding remarks.
2. Official export credit insurance: specific features
Contracts financed by an export credit imply deferral of payment until the
credit expires. As a result, exporters are exposed to a risk of foreign default.
Private sector insurance against political risk, defined as potential default by the
importing country as a whole, is virtually non-existent. Private insurers find the
potential losses associated with these risks too high or too difficult to predict.3
3 ŽStill, private insurance exists for the commercial risk of default i.e., potential default by an
.individual importer in relatively safe markets, which does not necessarily require a massive capacity
for claim reimbursement but may be limited due to problems of asymmetric information.
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Hence, in most developed economies, there is an official agency that issues
insurance guaranteed by the government. Coverage rates for political risk are
constrained and typically vary across agencies between 85% and 95%. Most
agencies never provide full insurance.4
The fraction of exports financed by official credits varies widely across
Ž .countries, even across EU member states Dewit, 1996, p. 9 . For instance, for the
period 1988–1992, the average fraction of export credits in total exports was
about 5% in Germany, 12% in the UK, and more than 20% in Austria. In the
United States, where export insurance is provided by the Eximbank rather than by
a separate export insurance agency, insured exports remain limited, accounting
only for about 5% of exports. Some 40% of total exports were, however, covered
by export insurance in Japan.
These officially insured credits are relatively unimportant for trade between
OECD-countries, but exports to newly emerging markets and developing regions
in general rely heavily on this type of financing. On average, Asian and Eastern
European destinations accounted for more than one third of the total contract
portfolio of official export insurance credit agencies in the early 1990s, and the
Žshare of Asian contracts continued to increase through the 1990s Boote and Ross,
.1998, p. 12 . A high fraction of imports is financed by export credits, especially in
newly emerging Southeast Asian markets. For instance, in 1995 about 50%, 30%
and 20% of imports were financed by export credits in Indonesia, the Philippines
and Thailand, respectively.5 In developing countries, export credits typically
accounted for 37% of total official debt in 1992, while this figure increased up to
Ž .48% for the 20 main recipients of export credits Kuhn et al., 1995, p. 7 .
A second striking feature of official export insurance schemes involves export
subsidisation, reflected in the sustained budgetary losses in the agencies’ balance
sheets, especially during the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the
1990s.
ŽTable 1 presents figures on premia, recoveries i.e., defaulted payments that the
.insurer manages to recuperate at a later date and claims for the period 1985–1995.
Before 1995, the income from official export insurance consisting of premia and
recoveries was systematically insufficient to match the reimbursements claimed,
covering merely 60% of claims.
Furthermore, premium rates are set according to export destination. Empirical
Ž .studies Abraham et al., 1992; Abraham and Dewit, 2000 show that global export
insurance subsidy estimates tend to conceal a pattern of regional concentration
towards specific markets. Subsidy rates, measured as the difference between
4 Partial coverage induces exporters to take actions that may facilitate the recovery of defaulted
losses, such as the use of escrow accounts. These are accounts held outside the debtor country through
Ž . Žwhich part of future export revenues of the debtor are channelled to the creditor Boote and Ross,
.1998, p. 47 .
5 Ž .These figures are based on OECD 1995 .
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Table 1
ŽPremia, recoveries and claims in official export credit insurance for Berne Union members in billion
.aUS dollars unless indicated otherwise
Ž .Source: Stephens 1999, p. 65 .
bŽ . Ž . Ž . wŽ . Ž .x Ž .Premia 1 Recoveries 2 Claims 3 1 q 2 r 3
1985–1989 9.26 17.97 47.13 0.58
1990–1994 15.38 23.61 65.71 0.59
1995–1997 11.10 25.90 27.62 1.34
a The Berne Union is the union of credit and investment insurers. Most official export credit
insurance agencies of OECD-countries are members.
b Premia plus recoveries as a fraction of claims.
claims and premia as a percentage of insured contracts, ranged on average between
2% and 12% during the period 1988–1992. However, for export contracts to
particular developing countries, especially if they are former colonies, subsidy
rates were well beyond the agency’s average. For instance, the subsidy rate for
export contracts insured against political risk by the Belgian state amounted to
17% for exports to Africa and Asia during the period 1984–1993. Those contracts
Žaccounted for 63% of the contracts underwritten by the government Abraham and
.Dewit, 2000, Table 1, p. 9 . These observations lead to a suggestion that aid
considerations rooted in political ties with the recipient country may underlie the
regional concentration of subsidies.
While premium rates differ according to the export destination, different
industries exporting to the same region cannot be legally charged different
premium rates. This does, however, not preclude governments from targeting
specific industries via export insurance. The share of exports to specific destina-
tions in total industry exports typically differs between industries. Thus, by
subsidising specific regional export insurance schemes, the government favours
domestic industries that export more to those subsidised export markets relative to
other sectors.6 Hence, even though premium rates are not industry-specific, the
differential subsidisation of export insurance by destination may leave consider-
able scope for industry targeting, albeit in an indirect way.
Although the WTO had prohibited export subsidisation, the rules for export
credit insurance subsidisation were strengthened significantly in 1995, when the
Ž . 7Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures SCM came into force.
Long-term losses in export credit insurance programmes were banned and WTO
6 Ž .This is in line with the findings by Melitz and Messerlin 1987 , who showed that interest
subsidies in export credits were concentrated in just a few sectors in France and the UK during the
early 1980s.
7 Ž .See Finger and Schuknecht 1999 for more details on the Subsidy Agreement, which was
negotiated during the Uruguay Round.
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members who suffered adverse effects from this type of subsidisation could use
the dispute settlement system. Table 1 clearly reflects that, after 1995, govern-
ments were more constrained in their premium rating policy. In 1995, official
export insurers almost reached a break-even position, and afterwards there was a
slightly positive cash-flow. In addition, negotiations within the OECD led to the
Ž .adoption of the Knaepen package June 1997 . From 1999 on, the OECD-Arrange-
ment stipulated minimum premium rates for political risk coverage.8
3. The model: export insurance and a monopolist exporter
The facts set out in the previous section shape the assumptions of the model.
Ž .The government of the exporting AhomeB country provides insurance against
potential default on exports to risky destinations. Private market insurance is not
available. Being mainly concerned with insurance against political risk, it can
reasonably be assumed that the government has the same information about the
risk involved in the contracts as the firms applying for insurance.9 In addition,
since its portfolio of underwritten contracts is much more diversified than that of
firms, the government is assumed to be risk neutral.10 Because insurance against
political risk typically entails less than full coverage, it is assumed throughout the
Žgame that the coverage rate i.e., the fraction of the value of the export contracts
. 11covered by insurance is fixed at a rate below 100%. This coverage rate is
denoted by g , with g-1.
A two-stage game is set up, in which the government has commitment power in
its premium subsidy policy, implying that premium rates are set before firms
choose their export actions. There is no consumption of the exported product in
the home country. It proves helpful to look first at the case of a home firm that has
a monopoly in the export market. This provides a useful benchmark, by eliminat-
ing strategic reasons for government intervention, which will be the focus of
Section 4. Given the constrained coverage rate, g , the risk neutral government sets
the export insurance premium rate, r, in the first stage, with r denoting the
premium per insured currency unit. The risk averse monopolist insures risky
exports and chooses output for the export market in the second stage.
8 Ž .Up to 1999, the OECD only provided an institutional framework the AOECD-ArrangementB for
the interest rates that could be charged for officially provided export loans.
9 If anything, the government may be better placed to assess the riskiness of export contracts. This is
not necessarily the case for insurance against commercial risk of default, where firms may have access
to more information about the risk type of the foreign buyer than the government insurer.
10 This assumption is not crucial but simplifies the analysis. The main point is that the government is
less risk averse than the exporters.
11 ŽAs mentioned in Section 2, limited coverage may, via the actions of exporters, help towards the ex
.post recovery of defaulted payments.
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3.1. The export decision of the monopolist
The game is solved backwards. The export quantity, x, is chosen by the risk
averse monopolist in the last stage of the game. Demand in the export market is
Ž .typically negatively sloped. R x denotes the firm’s export revenue, with R x
ER x ERŽ . x 12' )0 and R ' -0. A constant marginal cost of production isx xEx Ex
denoted by c. The default loss associated with political risk is specific to the
importing country and is denoted by l, a stochastic variable distributed with mean
2 w x w xEl and variance Õ over the closed interval a,b ; 0,1 . If the insured exporting
Ž .firm faces foreign default at the expiration date of the contract l)0 , it is
reimbursed for this loss through the coverage provided by the insurance policy.
It proves convenient to use a mean-variance formulation for the firm’s valua-
Ž . 13tion of risky profits EV . The firm’s optimisation problem is thus given by
b
maxEVsEPy var P 1Ž .
2x
with
EPs 1yElq Elyr g R x ycx 2aŽ . Ž . Ž .
2 2 2var Ps 1yg R x Õ 2bŽ . Ž . Ž .
EP and var P , respectively, denote the expected value and the variance of
profits. b is a positive constant, representing the degree of risk aversion.
I focus on the interior solution only. The first order condition of the problem in
Ž .Eq. 1 with respect to output is given by
2 21yElq Elyr gyb 1yg R x Õ R ycs0 3Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .x
Ž .The terms of the insurance contract r, g are crucial in determining the firm’s
export volume. More particularly, other things equal, a premium reduction affects
output positively. Furthermore, at a premium equal to or below the expected loss
Ž . Ž .i.e., rFEl , output unambiguously increases in the coverage rate d xrdg)0 .
Since the export decision is not separated from the coverage rate, the variance of
12 R -0 is required for the second order condition.x x
13 Ž .A similar approach is adopted by Viaene and de Vries 1992 , who analyse the effects of exchange
Žrate uncertainty on trade. The use of the mean-variance approach can be motivated in two ways see
.Huang and Litzenberger, 1988 . For arbitrary distributions of l, the approach can be justified by
assuming quadratic utility. Alternatively, for arbitrary preferences, a symmetrically truncated normal
distribution would have to be imposed on l.
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the default variable, Õ2, and the firm’s degree of risk aversion, b , affect the firm’s
output negatively.14
3.2. Optimal premium rating with A pureB official export insurance
I now turn to the first stage of the game. Here, the government chooses the
premium rate. The premium chosen under the objective of ApureB export insurance
is non-strategic, and at the same time does not include any elements of aid through
exports to the importing country. I henceforth refer to this premium as the
AbenchmarkB rate.
For insurance programmes to be effective, the contract terms must ensure that
risk averse exporters always want to be insured. More specifically, the choice of
the optimal premium rate is subject to a participation constraint; that is, r should
not exceed r, with r denoting the premium rate that makes the exporter indifferentˆ ˆ
R RŽ Ž . Ž ..between taking insurance or not EV r,g sEV x , with x denoting theˆ
export volume without insurance. Since the exporter is risk averse, r entails a taxˆ
Ž .ex ante r)El . Here, the risk neutral government has a AtraditionalB objectiveˆ
function, represented by EW and consisting of expected profits minus expected
subsidy costs. This objective function is maximised subject to the participation
constraint for the risk averse exporter, or
maxEWsEpyES 4Ž .
r
s.t. EV r ,g GEV r ,gŽ . Ž .ˆ
Deriving the optimal unconstrained premium rate requires d EWrdrs0. Since
Ž .EW 'EEWrErs0, maximising expression 4 impliesr
d x
Ep yES s0 5Ž . Ž .x x d r
2 2w Ž . x Ž . Ž . Žwith Ep 'EEprExs 1yElq Elyr g R ycsb 1yg R x Õ R fromx x x
Ž .. Ž .the first order condition in Eq. 3 , and ES 'EESrExs Elyr gR . Thex x
Ž . insAbenchmarkB premium rate, obtained from Eq. 5 , is denoted by r and is given
by:
21ygŽ .ins 2r sElyb R x Õ 6Ž . Ž .
g
Since r ins-El-r, the participation constraint is not binding. Compared to aˆ
Ž .situation of certainty with an equivalent fixed loss of El , the risk averse
14 A separation theorem between the export decision and the insurance decision applies when the firm
Žitself can choose the coverage rate simultaneously to the export decision and without constraints see
.Funatsu, 1986 . However, in the actual practice in export insurance against political risk, the
Ž .government constrains coverage see the stylised facts mentioned in Section 2 .
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domestic firm does not export enough due to the partial coverage. To attain the
export volume that would prevail under certainty, the premium rate is set below
the expected loss. After the derivation of the benchmark premium rate, the next
section turns to strategic premium rating.
4. Strategic premium rating in official export insurance
One of the goals often described in the mission statements of official export
insurance programmes is export promotion. This section determines the scope for
strategic subsidisation in export credit insurance.
4.1. The export decision of the oligopolist
Again, the second stage of the game is discussed first. Assume the home
exporter now competes with a foreign firm exporting to the risky market. Both
Ž ) .firms choose an action a and a for the home and the foreign firm, respectively
which refers to output under Cournot competition and to price under Bertrand
competition.15 The foreign firm’s export is denoted by x) , while c) and b ) are
positive constants representing its marginal cost of production and degree of risk
) )aversion, respectively. r and g indicate the premium and coverage rate in the
Ž ) . ) Ž ) .foreign insurance contract. R a,a and R a,a , respectively, denote the
revenue function for the home and foreign firm, with R 'ERrEa, R 'ER rEaa aa a
-0, R )) 'ER)rEa) and R ) )) 'ER )) rEa)-0. First order conditions fora a a a
optimal export actions by the home and the foreign firm, respectively, are
2 ) 2EV s 1yElq Elyr gyb 1yg R a,a Õ R ycx s0Ž . Ž . Ž .a a a
7aŽ .
2) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2 )
) )EV s 1yElq Elyr g yb 1yg R a,a Õ RŽ . Ž . Ž .a a
yc) x ))s0 7bŽ .a
with EV 'EEVrEa, EV ))'EEV )rEa) , x 'ExrEa, x )) 'Ex)rEa). Further-a a a a
) ) ) ) 16more, I assume csc , bsb , gsg and r sEl for convenience. Under
Cournot competition R )0, R )) )0 and x sx )) s1. Bertrand competitiona a a a
15 This generic approach, encompassing quantity and price competition, is suggested by Leahy and
Ž .Neary 1997 .
16 Ž ) .Retaliation issues are well understood in this type of subsidy games hence, r sEl is assumed .
While strengthening the case for a multilateral subsidy ban, retaliation does not eliminate the unilateral
incentive to subsidise.
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implies R -0, R )) -0, x -0 and x )) -0. The second order condition for thea a a a
home firm requires
2 ) 2EV s 1yElq Elyr gyb 1yg R a,a Õ RŽ . Ž . Ž .aa aa
2 2 2yb 1yg R Õ -0 8Ž . Ž .a
Ž .with EV 'EEV rE . The condition in Eq. 8 is satisfied since R -0 and itaa a a aa
Ž .follows from expression 7a that an interior solution requires the term between
square brackets to be positive. Similarly, EV ) )) -0 for the foreign firm.a a
Whether the firms’ reaction functions are positively or negatively sloped
crucially depends on the signs of the cross partial derivatives of the first order
conditions, EV )'EEV rEa) and EV )) 'EEV ))rEa. For the home firm, theaa a a a a
cross partial derivative of its first order condition is given by
2 ) 2
) )EV s 1yElq Elyr gyb 1yg R a,a Õ RŽ . Ž . Ž .aa aa
2 2
)yb 1yg R R Õ 9Ž . Ž .a a
Ž .Each firm’s own action is assumed to have a larger effect in absolute value on
its marginal valuation of profits than the rival’s action,17 implying EV -EV )aa aa
and EV ) )) -EV )) .a a a a
In addition, the requirements for stability of the game have to be met.18 In the
Ž .)certainty case, the stability condition is typically given by y p qp )0,aa aa
with p 'Ep rEa and p )'Ep rEa). With uncertainty, the following condi-aa a aa a
tion has to hold for stability:
y EV qEV ) )0 10Ž . Ž .aa aa
This condition is more restrictive than the corresponding stability condition
Ž . Ž .) )under certainty, y p qp )0, since expression 9 suggests that EV )0aa aa aa
may prevail even if p )-0.aa
Finally, Cournot competition where outputs are strategic substitutes under
Ž .)certainty p -0 is henceforth referred to as AstandardB Cournot competition.aa
Analogously, Bertrand competition where prices are strategic complements under
Ž .)certainty p )0 will be labelled as AstandardB Bertrand competition.aa
Proposition 1. In a duopoly, export actions which are strategic substitutes under
( ))certainty p -0 , are strategic complements with uncertainty and partial exportaa( ))insurance EV )0 if the coÕerage rate is sufficiently low, or if the Õariance ofaa
the default rate in the export market and the degree of risk aÕersion are
sufficiently high.
17 This assumption corresponds to the standard assumption in strategic trade models under certainty
Žunder which a firm’s own action on its marginal profitability dominates the cross effect for a detailed
Ž .discussion, see Leahy and Neary 1997, p. 645 .
18 Ž .Stability requirements are discussed in Seade 1980 .
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Ž .Proof. In expression 9 the term between squared brackets is positive as is
Ž . )required by the first order condition in Eq. 7a . R -0 under Cournot behavioura
and R ))0 with Bertrand behaviour. Hence, R R )-0 under both duopolya a a
Ž) )types. With standard Bertrand competition under certainty, p )0 or R )0aa aa
. Ž . )with constant c . Hence, from expression 9 , EV )0 under uncertainty. Withaa
Ž) )standard Cournot competition under certainty, p -0 or R -0 with constantaa aa
. Ž . )c . However, it follows from Eq. 9 that EV )0 will prevail under uncertaintyaa
if 19
)1yElq Elyr g RŽ . aa 2-b Õ 11Ž .2)
) )R R a,a qR R 1ygŽ . Ž .Ž .aa a a
This inequality is more likely to occur if b andror Õ2 are relatively high, andror
)g is relatively low. Note that, if EV )0 under Cournot competition, aaa
Ž .sufficient but non-necessary condition for the stability requirement in Eq. 10 not
Ž . Ž .to be violated follows from Eqs. 8 and 9 , and is given by
R qR ))0 12 IŽ .a a
Proposition 1 implies that reaction functions under Cournot competition are
positively sloped if EV ))0 and EV )) )0. This is immediately clear from theaa a a
total differentiation of the home firm’s first order condition, which implies:
da EV )aasy )0 13Ž .)da EVaa
Ž .Expression 13 indicates that the slope of the home firm’s reaction function is
positive.
Intuitively, because both marginal expected profit and marginal profit variabil-
) Ž ) ) .ity of the domestic firm decrease in a with a sx for Cournot competition ,
the sign of EV ) depends on the relative sizes of each of those effects. If theaa
home coverage rate is sufficiently small, or the home firm’s degree of risk
aversion and the variance of the default rate in the export market are sufficiently
high, the effect on marginal profit variability dominates the effect on marginal
expected profit and the home firm’s reaction function is positively sloped. A
reduction in the home firm’s marginal profit variability caused by an expansion of
the foreign firm’s output, induces the home firm to respond by increasing its
output too.
19 Ž .The inequality in Eq. 11 guarantees an interior solution provided that
)
)R R a,aŽ .aaw xcx - 1yElq Ely r g R 1yŽ .a a )
) )R R a,a qR RŽ .aa a a
and a similar condition for the foreign firm is imposed.
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4.2. Strategic premium rating in official export insurance
Taking into account that domestic revenues now depend on the foreign rival’s
Ž Ž ) ..action R a, a , the government sets the regional premium rate by maximising
Ž .expression 4 .
Proposition 2. EÕen when an export subsidy is optimal in the certainty case,
strategic export insurance premium rating inÕolÕes taxing insured exports if the
foreign coÕerage rate is sufficiently low, or if the Õariance of the default rate in
the export market and the degree of risk aÕersion by the foreign riÕal are
sufficiently high.
Ž .Proof. EW in Eq. 4 is totally differentiated and set equal to zero. Since EW s0r
and EW )s0, this procedure yields:r
Ep yES daq Ep )yES ) da)s0 14Ž . Ž . Ž .a a a a
2 ) 2Ž . Ž . Ž Ž .. w Ž)with Ep sb 1yg R a,a Õ R from Eq. 7a , Ep s 1yElq Elya a a
. x Ž . Ž .) ) )r g R , ES s Elyr gR , and ES s Elyr gR . After rearranging ex-a a a a a
Ž . opression 14 , the optimal unconstrained premium rate, r , is obtained:
R ) da)ao ins w xr sr y 1yEl 15Ž .
gR daa
ins Ž Ž ..with r denoting the benchmark rate see Eq. 6 . The strategic premium
Ž . )element is represented by the last term of expression 15 , with da rdas
Ž ) ) .) ) )y EV rEV denoting the slope of the foreign firm’s reaction function. Botha a a a
under Cournot and Bertrand competition, R )rR -0. Hence, if da)rd a)0a a
under uncertainty, then r o)r ins. From Proposition 1, da)rd a)0 may occur
under uncertainty even though p )) -0 under certainty, if the foreign firm’sa a
coverage rate is sufficiently low, or the variance of the default rate in the export
market and the foreign firm’s risk aversion are sufficiently high. Note that, if
r o)r, the participation constraint imposes an upper boundary on the strategic taxˆ
and then rsr)El. Hence, the actually chosen premium rate, r, will be equal toˆ
 o 4rsmin r , r )El.ˆ I
There are many caveats associated with the strategic trade proposals. The
government not only needs to know the precise market demand conditions and the
firms’ cost structures, but also requires accurate information on the type of
oligopolistic behaviour as well as the number of competitors in the export market.
The analysis here shows that the informational requirements for optimal strategic
government action via export insurance are magnified. Besides the coverage rate
specified in export insurance schemes, the variability of foreign revenues and the
firms’ attitudes to risk determine whether the optimal strategic premium rate
entails a subsidy or a tax.
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Moreover, there are other issues that make the implementation of a strategic
trade policy very problematic. There is, for instance, the fundamental problem of
Ž .retaliation. Furthermore, recent work Lee, 1990 has stressed the importance of
firms’ ownership for the optimal strategic trade policy. Indeed, if asset markets
have permitted international diversification by a country’s residents—or even
without complete diversification—there is no gain to domestic residents from
Ž .rent-shifting as proposed by strategic trade policy Feeney and Hillman, 2001 .
Thus, the targeting of industries via trade policy for strategic reasons provides a
rather limited explanation for the prevalence of export insurance subsidies. A more
general explanation is provided by the political economy perspective on trade
policy, which suggests that governments tend to favour selected industries to
maximise political support.
5. Aid-related premium rating in official export insurance
Here, another motive for export insurance subsidisation is presented. More
specifically, this section discusses premium rating when the government of the
home country has a special political interest in assisting the importing country.
The resulting premium rate will then have positive welfare effects in that
importing country. Providing cheap export insurance benefits consumers in the
export market through lower import prices. I label this type of intervention as
politically inspired development aid. Obviously, such AaidB only affects foreign
consumers insofar as they value the insured products. Effective assistance via this
method therefore requires that a large share of the supported country’s total
imports is purchased from the AdonorB country. A straightforward way of mod-
elling this motive is by including the importing country’s consumer surplus,
generated from buying the exporters’ product, into the objective function of the
home government.
With the new motive for intervention, the home government’s objective
˜function is denoted by EW and given by
˜
f )maxEWsEpyESqaCS a,aŽ .
r
s.t. EV r ,g GEV r ,g 16Ž . Ž .Ž .ˆ
Ž .The last term in Eq. 16 represents the aid motive in the compounded objective
function. A non-negative constant, a , denotes the weight20 of the importing
fŽ ) .country’s consumer surplus, CS a,a .
If the home exporter would hold a monopoly in the export market, the
aid-inspired premium would clearly entail a subsidy. The subsidy reduces the
20 Ž .Similarly, Long and Vousden 1991 allocate exogenous weights to different interest groups.
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export price, which will increase the consumer surplus in the importing country. In
oligopolistic export markets, the aid-inspired premium will be determined by the
Ž .direct effect of the firm’s action on foreign consumer surplus and by the indirect
strategic effect on foreign consumer surplus.
Proposition 3. The inclusion of GaidH in official export insurance schemes leads
to a direct premium subsidy; in oligopolistic export markets, this direct premium
subsidy is magnified when firms’ actions are strategic complements but dampened
when firms’ actions are strategic substitutes.
˜ Ž .Proof. The total differential of EW in Eq. 16 is set equal to zero. With
˜ ˜ )EW sEW s0, this yieldsr r
Ep yES qaCSf daq Ep )yES )qaCS )f da)s0 17Ž .Ž . Ž .a a a a a a
with CSf 'ECSfrEa and CS )f 'ECSfrEa). Ep , Ep ) , ES , and ES ) area a a a a a
Ž . Ž . 21given with expression 14 . Hence, expression 18 is obtained
da) a da)
ins f f
)rsr yf y CS qCS 18Ž .a až /da gR daa
w xŽ .)with fs 1yEl R rgR . The aid-related premium element is representeda a
Ž .by the last term in Eq. 18 , which captures how premium rating is affected
by a concern for the consumer surplus in the importing country. Under
Cournot behaviour, CSf )0 and R )0, while CSf -0 and R -0 undera a a a
Bertrand competition. Hence, the direct effect on the premium rate is
fŽ Ž . .negative y argR CS -0 , always operating towards a subsidy. Sincea a
fŽ . )y argR CS -0, the strategic component reinforces the direct effect ifa a
da)rd a)0 and reduces it if da)rd a-0. I
) Ž ) ) .) ) )Since the absolute value of da rdasy EV rEV is smaller than one,a a a a
the aid-inspired premium presumptively entails a premium subsidy.22
Thus, in the case of strategic complements aid-inspired and strategic interven-
tion operate in opposite directions, implying that subsidisation occurs at the
expense of export rents for the home country.23 By contrast, when firms’ actions
21 Ž .Here too, if the expression in Eq. 18 exceeds r, rs r.ˆ ˆ
22 This is always true under strategic complementarity and also holds under strategic substitutability
with homogeneous goods. However, under Cournot competition with differentiated goods, the direct
subsidy may be dominated by the strategic term, advocating a tax in the unlikely case that CS f-CS )f .x x
23 This is true unless the subsidies are so high that they would effectively deter foreign rival
Ž .exporters. The issue of entry deterring subsidisation is well understood. Dixit and Kyle 1985 have
extensively analysed this possibility in a model with certainty.
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are strategic substitutes, both the objectives of strategic export promotion and
AaidB require subsidisation. In addition, from a political economy perspective,
government concern for the political support of certain industries may mandate
export insurance subsidies. If the government chooses to subsidise export insur-
ance, then, irrespective of the actual motive behind the subsidisation, both
domestic exporters and consumers in the export market benefit from the cheap
insurance schemes.
However, which of these two distinct groups is targeted specifically and which
will hence be the main beneficiary depends very heavily on the dominant motive
of the government underlying its policy of subsidisation. One could to a large
extent infer which motive is dominant in the subsidisation of a particular region by
examining the composition of the government’s portfolio of insured contracts.
Suppose a large fraction of export insurance contracts to a particular subsidised
region are concentrated in a few domestic sectors, or even, in a few domestic
firms. Then, the main motive for subsidising that market is either to secure
political support from specific domestic firms or to engage in surreptitious
rent-capturing against rival foreign exporters to that market. In either case, it is the
group of domestic firms that is specifically targeted by the subsidy. Although
foreign importers will gain, the extent to which they benefit may be almost
negligible, especially if the subsidising country’s exports to the market involved
are relatively small. By contrast, if a particular export destination accounts for a
large share of total contracts insured by the government of the exporting country,
the motivation to subsidise insurance for that region is probably AaidB. This is
especially likely if insurance contracts to that region are not concentrated in a few
industries. While importers will then gain substantially in the form of lower prices
for a wide range of products, subsidies do not necessarily accrue to a few specific
firms, but are more likely to be spread across domestic industries.
Evidently, for some regions, a mixture of these two motives may be the
underlying cause for subsidisation, implying that both domestic firms and foreign
importers will benefit significantly. In that case, there are clearly dual surrepti-
tiously targeted beneficiaries to the subsidised export insurance scheme.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a model of official export insurance has been presented. The
analysis focused on how public insurance schemes might offer scope for govern-
ments to engage inconspicuously in strategic export promotion and to further
political interests in risky export markets.
It has been shown that governments can target specific industries indirectly,
that is, by subsidising exports to specific markets via the instrument of export
insurance. Official export insurance programmes may therefore conceal strategic
rent capturing in less developed markets. However, the analysis emphasised that
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strategic intervention via export insurance may involve a premium tax, even if a
subsidy would be recommended under certainty. In that case, strategic subsidies
via export insurance schemes will affect domestic welfare negatively. Strategic
intervention via export insurance thus proves even more problematic than direct
strategic export promotion. Hence, a political economy perspective based on
securing political support from powerful domestic groups, may provide a more
plausible explanation for the pattern of industry targeted support via export
insurance.
A second motive for intervention via export insurance has been presented.
Ž .When the government of the exporting country has a special political interest in
the importing country, AaidB may be incorporated in official export insurance
schemes. AAidB-inspired subsidies mainly benefit foreign buyers. When, in addi-
tion, insured contracts to the subsidised region are highly concentrated in very few
export sectors, exporting firms in those sectors will also gain significantly.
Regionally differentiated subsidisation of export insurance has two obfuscatory
advantages for a government. Firstly, policies that are internationally prohibited
can be disguised behind policy instruments that are allowed. Secondly, policies
can be surreptitiously targeted towards particular firms, while the government
appears to keep to non-discriminatory rules.
I conclude by outlining the limitations of the analysis. Constructing one general
Ž .model of official export insurance is an impossible task Stephens, 1999, p. 5 .
The model presented here is probably most relevant in the European context.
Ž . Ž .Carmichael 1987 and Gruenspecht 1988 have used an alternative model where
firms seeking export credit support can commit to their price before the govern-
Ž .ment in their models the USA’s EximBank sets the terms of the export credit.
Although certainly possible in some cases—Carmichael quotes the case of Boeing
—there is no reason to believe that firms can credibly commit to a price as a
general rule.
The model is particularly relevant for the practice in export insurance during
the period before 1995. Since then, the WTO-rules and OECD arrangements
regarding premium rating for political risk have been strengthened, and OECD
member states committed to minimum premium rates in 1999. Commitment to
Žnon-intervention has been discussed in the literature see, for instance, Hwang and
.Schulman, 1993 . In the context of export insurance, the current willingness of
governments to subscribe to such an agreement coincides with the emergence of
the private sector in insuring political risk. Private insurers, however, still limit
their activities to relatively safe markets, leaving the high-risk segment of this type
of insurance to the government.
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